Previously, I discussed the role of providing services (health, education, sanitation, etc…) in counterinsurgency. After security, services represent a critical component in winning hearts and minds and strengthening the legitimacy of the state. With threats to personal security in Iraq on the decline (but still high), the provision of services is gaining increasing importance and this fact has not gone unnoticed by the US military.
Iraq contains a massive and intricate irrigation system of canals and pumping stations. The water it supplies and the flooding it controls are essential to the agriculturally dominated southern Iraq. Much of this canal system was left unusable after the initial 2003 invasion, either through direct damage or simply lack of maintenance. The fields the canal system supports are a sizable proportion of the Iraqi domestic economy.
The fact that a provisional reconstruction team (PRT) is repairing the irrigation canals and their pumping stations is mildly interesting, but nothing to write home about. However, what stands out is the fact that they are using a valuable security resource in an unorthodox way to do it:
In order to help the GoI monitor and maintain the canals, 2nd BCT Soldiers came up with a high-tech solution. In addition to Soldiers performing foot patrols and SoI guarding key points, 2nd BCT Soldiers regularly keep a watch on the canals with unmanned aerial vehicles.
“We’ve done this with every single canal,” Clegg said. “We had (the MoWR) supply us a map, showing the direction of flow. Then we stepped it up with UAV coverage. This actually allowed us to see where the water is flowing.” [Emphasis mine]
Clegg says the images are declassified and shown to MoRW officials every week to give them the information they need.
Simply put, the PRT is using UAV surveillance flights to monitor the status of irrigation canal flows. This is the first example I have found of UAVs being used in a non-security function to improve services to Iraqi civilians. The use of UAVs, a much prized resource amongst commanders, hints at the new importance placed on providing services (particularly water); a ’service surge’ if you will. It is also a reminder of the remarkable flexibility of the US military.
A few weeks ago, I had the pleasure of attending a talk given by Colonel Peter Mansoor. Col. Mansoor is a member of Petreus’ inner circle and has been influential in the development of the US Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. Mansoor is also an architect of the surge strategy in Iraq and recently published Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq, an analysis of counterinsurgency in Iraq from a mid-level officer.
During the questions and answer section I asked the Colonel what was the role of providing health and social services in modern counterinsurgency doctrine. He took the (very reasonable) position that the primary concern of civilian populations is security. That is, without security, nothing else matters. However, once a certain level of security has been established, the population looks for the provision of services (including health services). In this ’second stage’, of counterinsurgency the provision of health services plays a major role in winning hearts and minds. Mansoor’s position is that Iraq was just barely in this second stage.
I agree with Mansoor, but believe the effect is more nuanced. The two stages (security and services) are not firmly separated. Rather, as the population gradually feels less security needs, people begin to look for the provision of services.
Iraqi forces swept unopposed into Baghdad’s Sadr City today after a compromise with firebrand cleric Moktada al-Sadr. Most commentary focused on the impressive showing of the Iraqi Army, which conducted the operation largely independently. However, I (and also Dr. iRack from Abu Muqawama) noticed something else:
By late Tuesday, Iraqi troops had pushed deep into the district and set up positions around hospitals and police stations, which the Iraqi government was seeking to bring under its control.
A primary target for Iraqi forces seems to have been the facilities providing health services in the area. In the recent weeks Al-Sadr’s militia has tried to use ownership of these services to gain support amongst the population. Now with Iraqi forces firmly in control of Sadr City’s hospitals, it is a race against time to expand and improve available health services to win the support and loyalty of local residents.
Dr. Irack put it well: “[counterinsurgency] is a contest to influence and control the population”. The provision of health services is a low cost, yet powerful, approach to winning that contest. Those providing health services have a significant advantage in winning hearts, minds, and legitimacy in the population. By providing services, the government is aligning itself with the population’s interest. From then on, insurgent attacks are not simply a strike by one side against another, but an attack against the providers of the population’s health. In turn, the population is more willing to cooperate with local security forces in routing out insurgents and sympathizers. If in counterinsurgency populations are the battlefields, then hospitals are part of the commanding heights.
Last month, American and Iraqi forces launched a major push into the Sadr City section of Baghdad. The operations led to intense fighting and crippled Sadr City’s already flimsy infrastructure. As a result, large swaths of Sadr City are currently without trash collection, sewer systems, electricity, food, and access to health services.
The situation in Sadr city represents not only a humanitarian disaster, but also a direct threat to winning hearts and minds. Michael Gordon, in his New York Times article, points out the problem:
On Saturday, three Sadr City residents gingerly approached an American Army position to deliver a warning: Unless the Iraqi government or its American partner did something to restore essential services and remove the piles of garbage, the militias would gain more support.
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“Through a ‘Hezbollah-like’ scheme, the Shiite Sadrist movement has established itself as the main service provider in the country,” notes a recent report by Refugees International, an advocacy group. “As a result of the importance of nonstate actors in the delivery of assistance and security, civilians are joining militias.”
The lack of infrastructure, sanitation, and health services offer opportunities for militias to move quickly, winning hearts and minds by merely providing token services to residents. While the Iraqi government can provide greater levels of support, militias can provide support right now. For example, the Iraqi government is promising $150 million to bolster Sadr City’s infrastructure, however, it will not do so until the security situation improves. The speed of the Sadrists allows them to compete against the Iraqi government for public support at a fraction of the cost. That is, in the battle for hearts and minds, $100 today is worth more than a $10,000 a year from now.