Last month, the UN Security Council voted unanimously (which is not an easy feat) to classify rape as a tactic in war and a threat to international security:
Stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and expresses its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence;
You can read the full text of the resolution 1820 here.
The move comes a few months after the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that practice of the widespread rape has ‘taken a life of its own‘ and reached epidemic proportions in some African conflict zones.
UNOSAT gives us a snapshot of the security situation in Mogadishu since the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces captured the capital in December 2006. The data comes from news reports from the Shabelle Media Network (SMN), Garowe Online (GO), SomaliNet (SN), East African Standard (EAS), The Nation (Nairobi), Kenya Times, Reuters, BBC, AP, AFP, Washington Post & Aljazeera. I’ll hand it off to UNOSAT for a more detailed description. Click the image for the full map in PDF.
This map provides an overview of the reported security events in Mogadishu since the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and allied Ethiopian forces took control of the capital on 29 December 2006. Security events have been classified according to the type of weapon used: 1-mortars; 2-rocket propelled grenades (RPG); 3-hand grenades; and 4-small arms. Urban areas with increasing concentrations of security events (”hot spots”) have been highlighted with a color scale increasing from blue to red. This intensity image has also been weighted by the type of weapon used, giving prominence to mortars and RPG-based events. Each point symbol represents a specific event in a given location and time. In those instances when multiple mortar shells fell in a specific area on the same day (e.g. 4 mortars fell at the Airport) a single event point symbol was assigned. The spatial accuracy of most points is within 100m of the true location; however a significant minority of events have large degrees of uncertainly and may be accurate only to within a few kilometers. All security-related information used in this analysis has been acquired exclusively from public media sources. The security events depicted on this map have not been independently verified on the ground nor are they likely representative of all security and humanitarian events in this area. Casualty figures recorded for each security event are also likely to be significant underestimates. All security-related data collection, analysis and map production has been done by UNOSAT to help provide the humanitarian community with a spatial context to the ongoing security events in Mogadishu.
When discussing the relationship between HIV/AIDS and developing world militaries, some statements are generally accepted as fact. First, there is a higher HIV/AIDS prevalence amongst military services than amongst comparable civilians. Second, HIV/AIDS prevalence cripples the ability of the armed forces to conduct their duties. Third, war spreads HIV/AIDS. Fourth, HIV/AIDS is a threat to national security. In a 2006 journal article, Alan Whiteside, Alex de Waal, and Tsadkan Gebre-Tensae analyzed these four accepted wisdoms in African militaries.
1. Do soldiers have higher HIV prevalence?
Whiteside, de Waal, and Gebre-Tensae conclude HIV/AIDS prevalence in militaries is determined by two competing factors. First, young recruits typically have less HIV prevalence than the general population, driving down the overall prevalence. Second, older servicemen often have higher prevalence than the source civilian population raising prevalence. These factors work against each other, with the latter likely having more sway. Thus, the statement that militaries typically have three or four times the HIV/AIDS prevalence than civilians is unlikely.
2. Does HIV/AIDS undermine military effectiveness?
On this point the authors argue HIV/AIDS could -and likely (in the case of Uganda) has- undermined military effectiveness. However, militaries are specifically structured to absorb losses and built in redundancies likely negate most negative effects of HIV/AIDS losses.
3. Does war contribute to the spread of HIV?
Against this point the authors argue there is not the data to support it either way. Specifically they argue that since Rwanda was the only example of HIV/AIDS used as a weapon, the military use of HIV/AIDS is essentially an anomaly. That is, armed conflict spreading HIV/AIDS is the exception, not the rule.
4. Does HIV/AIDS imperil national security?
The authors argue the connection between HIV/AIDS and political instability is inconclusive. High HIV/AIDS prevalence is correlated with a number of other factors likely contributing to political instability. With this in mind, it is impossible to claim HIV/AIDS is a cause of instability any more than other factors.
My point in highlighting this article is not to argue it either way, but to make a simple assertion: political science and public health lack even basic understanding of the interrelationship between armed conflict and HIV/AIDS. That is, there is work to be done.
Source:
Whiteside, Alan, Alex de Waal, and Tsadkan Gebre-Tensae. 2006. “AIDS, security and the military in Africa: A sober appraisal.” Afr Aff (Lond) 105(419):201-218.
While at the Naval Postgraduate School, a smart US Army civil affairs officer pointed out that Afghans’ animals are their prized possessions. The wealth of villages is easily determined by looking at the health of their livestock. Given this, the military has been running veterinary programs in Afghanistan to help win over hearts and minds. Not a bad idea at all. Recently, I stumbled upon a program which hints at an expansion of this practice into Africa:
US military forces have launched a veterinary project in Gulu and Amuru displaced persons’ camps that aims to vaccinate 12,000 cattle and 130,000 goats over the next month. The US team, working with the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, will be treating the livestock free of charge.
This is the type of program I love to see. Winning hearts and minds through applying US power to health, even if it is for animals. The operations are low cost (relative to combat), cause positive “collateral damage”, and attack the social networks which breed political / religious radicalism.
Jeff Gettleman of the New York Times makes the troubling suggestion that the violence ravaging Kenya over the last few weeks might have been planned.
At first the violence seemed as spontaneous as it was shocking, with machete-wielding mobs hacking people to death and burning women and children alive in a country that was celebrated as one of Africa’s most stable.
But a closer look at what has unfolded in the past three weeks, since a deeply flawed election plunged Kenya into chaos, shows that some of the bloodletting that has left more than 650 people dead may have been premeditated and organized.
Leaflets calling for ethnic killings mysteriously appeared before the voting. Politicians with both the government and opposition parties gave speeches that stoked long-standing hatred among ethnic groups. And local tribal chiefs held meetings to plot attacks on rivals, according to some of them and their followers.
Donald Rothchild, a professor at UC Davis and expert on ethnic violence, who sadly passed away last year, was said to have a favorite saying: There are no spontaneous rallies. Behind all mass violence lies the machinations of a society’s elite. With the situation in Kenya not getting any better, Don’s words are food for thought.